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INTRODUCTION
The London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) is often called the
world’s “most important number,” and is the most commonly indexed
interest rate in the world.1 In 2008, the combined gross domestic
product of the world’s economy was estimated at $60 trillion.2 Yet, due
to leverage, approximately $360 trillion in swaps and $10 trillion in
loans were indexed to LIBOR.3 Currently, most of the swap market and
70% of the U.S. futures market reference LIBOR.4 The Economist

1. See Nick Summers, The UBS Libor-Fraud E-mails Are a Gift for Regulators,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/
2012-12-19/the-ubs-libor-fraud-emails-are-a-gift-for-regulators.
2. See GDP, WORLD BANK GRP., http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries?display=graph.
3. See Simone Foxman, How Barclays Made Money on LIBOR Manipulation,
BUS. INSIDER (July 10, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-barclays-mademoney-on-libor-manipulation-2012-7. In swaps, the notional amount does not change
hands, which allows investors exposure to a benchmark without having to tie up
significant capital. See infra note 284.
4. See Remarks of Chairman Gary Gensler at London City Week on Benchmark
Interest Rates, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N (Apr. 22, 2013),
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recently estimated that approximately $800 trillion worth of financial
instruments are tied to LIBOR.5
LIBOR measures the rate it costs banks to borrow money from
each other for a short period of time.6 Every day numerous banks are
contacted and asked how much it costs to borrow short-term funds.7
The banks’ answers are then averaged to calculate that day’s LIBOR.8
From August 2005 until at least 2009, numerous banks and brokerdealers routinely falsified or colluded to falsify LIBOR submissions.9
As of October 2013, three investment banks and one broker-dealer
admitted wrongdoing, and authorities have subpoenaed eleven other
banks.10 One leading academic testified before Congress that the
LIBOR scandal is the largest financial scam in recorded history.11
On May 20, 2008, the New York Federal Reserve (“N.Y. Fed”),
under the leadership of Timothy Geithner, claimed to have heard from
several Eurodollar brokers about suspicious LIBOR submissions. 12
Banks claimed to submit to the British Bankers’ Association (“BBA”)
the rate at which they can borrow funds.13 But according to the dealers,
banks were in practice bidding on the open market an additional 25 basis
points above their BBA submissions.14 Geithner claims he informed the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the U.S.

http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-140
[hereinafter
CFTC, Gensler Remarks].
5. See The Rotten Heart of Finance, ECONOMIST, July 7, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21558281.
6. See BBA, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF BBA
LIBOR—STRENGTHENING FOR HE FUTURE § 3.3 (2008) [hereinafter BBA REPORT].
7. See infra notes 36–55 and accompanying text.
8. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6 at 1.
9. See infra Part I; see also Douglas Keenan, My Thwarted Attempt to Tell of
Libor Shenanigans, FIN. TIMES (July 26, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms
/s/0/dc5f49c2-d67b-11e1-ba60-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2GxizaQGl (claiming LIBOR
manipulation was known amongst bankers as early as 1991).
10. See infra Part I.
11. The Annual Report of the Financial Stability Oversight Council: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 15 (2012) (statement of Andrew Lo,
Professor, MIT) (“This LIBOR fixing scandal dwarfs by orders of magnitude any
financial scam in the history of [the] markets.”).
12. See SAMUEL CHEUN & MATT RASKIN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., RECENT
CONCERNS REGARDING LIBOR’S CREDIBILITY (2008).
13. See id.
14. See id.
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Commodities and Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), and Bank of
England of the false submissions.15 Yet the manipulations continued,
and the only timely result was that the BBA published a report
evaluating LIBOR.16
In 2012, after various news reports surfaced claiming that banks
were deliberately manipulating LIBOR rates, U.K. regulators launched
an investigation into how to reform LIBOR.17 The investigation
concluded and published its results and recommendations in The
Wheatley Review of LIBOR: Final Report.18 Then Secretary of the
Treasury, Geithner announced that U.S. regulators would not rely on
U.K. regulators to solve LIBOR’s problems.19 The House Financial
Services Committee, however, doubted Geithner’s claim and openly
questioned the appropriateness of Geithner’s previous attempts to
reform LIBOR.20
Many commentators have called for LIBOR reform.21 Most of
these commentators have suggested that LIBOR should be based upon
actual transactions.22 Due to Basel III requirements, however, many
banks have recently stopped lending unsecured funds to other banks.23
15. See The Annual Report of the Financial Stability Oversight Council: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 10 (2012) (statement of Timothy
Geithner, Secretary of the Treasury).
16. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6.
17. See MARTIN WHEATLEY ET AL., THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL
REPORT (2012) [hereinafter WHEATLEY REVIEW].
18. See id.
19. See Richard Blackden, US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner Warns Libor
Reform Won’t Be Left ‘to the British’, THE TELEGRAPH (July 19, 2012),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9410557/USTreasury-Secretary-Tim-Geithner-warns-Libor-reform-wont-be-left-to-the-British.html;
see also Press Release, CNBC, Transcript of Timothy Geithner Interview (July 19,
2012), available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/48197285.
20. See The Annual Report of the Financial Stability Oversight Council: Hearing
Before The H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 10 (2012).
21. See infra Part II. But see Lucy McNulty, Barclays Rate-Fixing Scandal: Libor
Alternatives
Analysed,
INT’L
FIN.
REV.
(July
10,
2012),
http://www.iflr.com/Article/3058468/Regulatory/Barclays-rate-fixing-scandal-Liboralternatives-analysed.html (showing the results of a pool where only 19% or
respondents favored abolishing Libor.)
22. See, e.g., Rebecca Tabb & Joseph Grundfest, Alternatives to LIBOR, 8 CAPITAL
MKTS. L.J. 229 (2013); Justin T. Wong, Libor Left in Limb: A Call for More Reform, 13
N.C. BANKING INST. 365, 381 (2009).
23. See CFTC, Gensler Remarks, supra note 4.
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Some bankers have even suggested that they may never again lend
unsecured funds to other banks for tenors longer than 30 days.24
Due to the difficulties in reforming LIBOR, U.K. regulators and
many academics are debating using an alternative to LIBOR for
measuring interbank loans.25 Most of these commentators focus on OIS
swaps, repo rates, Treasury notes, and committed quotes.26 This
Comment proposes a new LIBOR alternative based upon the CFTC’s
swap clearing house requirements.27
Under 17 C.F.R. § 50, the CFTC has promulgated that FX and
fixed-to-variable rate swaps must be executed through a clearinghouse.28
A similar rule can be enacted for inter-bank loans. Effectively, U.S.
banks currently use the Federal Reserve System as a clearinghouse for
overnight loans. It would be relatively simple to create a clearinghouse
for loans with longer terms .29
Alternatively, banks can be required to lend funds through an
exchange.30 In a recent article, Rebecca Tabb and former SEC
commissioner Joseph Grundfest suggested such an approach.31 Tabb
and Grundfest’s proposal, however, fails to account for differences
amongst banks’ creditworthiness.32 Unlike swaps, which are notional
contracts, LIBOR loans are direct loans that reflect a bank’s
creditworthiness.33 Forcing banks to lend on an exchange would be the
equivalent of forcing banks to lend to less creditworthy peers.34 Banks
would then have to raise rates in order to account for the additional risk
premium.35 This Comment attempts to avoid the credit premium
problem by proposing an inter-banking rating system where banks
participating in the exchange only lend to other banks that have an open
line of credit with the lending bank.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See id.
See infra Part II.
See infra notes 269–307 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.
See 17 C.F.R. § 50.2(a)(2) (2013).
See infra Part III.
See Tabb & Grundfest, supra note 22, at 255.
See id.
See LAURENCE MUTKIN & ELAINE LIN, MORGAN STANLEY RESEARCH,
INTEREST RATE STRATEGY, WHAT FUTURE FOR LIBOR? (2012).
33. See infra notes 284–286.
34. See MUTKIN & LIN, supra note 32.
35. See id.
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Part I of this Comment will introduce the reader to LIBOR, explain
how it is calculated, and show the reader why it is important. Part I will
then proceed to show the reader how banks and broker dealers
manipulated LIBOR, and explain the effects of the manipulations. Part
II will summarize and analyze the two main reviews of LIBOR: the
BBA’s 2008 review and the 2012 Wheatley Review. Part II will then
examine how a fair and accurate benchmark is created. Additionally,
Part II will explain some of the most commonly cited LIBOR
alternatives. Finally, Part III will introduce, analyze, and discuss the
viability of LIBOR alternatives not mentioned in Part II.
I. WHAT IS LIBOR AND WHAT WENT WRONG
Part I of this Comment will introduce the reader to LIBOR and
explain how it is calculated and regulated. Part I will then explain why
LIBOR is important. Finally, Part I will show how the financial
industry manipulated LIBOR and describe the responses of U.K. and
U.S regulators.
A. CALCULATING LIBOR
Modern day BBA36 LIBOR was created in 198537 and tracks the
rate at which banks can borrow short-term funds from each other in
London at 11 a.m.38 Prior to 2013, BBA LIBOR tracked U.S. Dollars39
(USD LIBOR) and nine other currencies40 in 15 tenors, or maturities.41
In total, there were 150 daily LIBOR rates.42
36. The BBA is a not-for-profit industry trade group that regularly advocated for its
members, including banks on its LIBOR panels. See David Enrich & Max Colchester,
Before Scandal, Clash Over Control of Libor, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324556304578119151811254648.htm
l.
37. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 2.3.
38. See id. § 3.1.
39. USD LIBOR does not track U.S. Dollars, rather, USD LIBOR tracks
Eurodollars. See id. § 3.3. U.S. Dollar is defined as a United States Dollar in the United
States. Eurodollars is defined as the United States Dollar outside of the U.S.
Accordingly, because LIBOR tracks U.S. dollars in London, USD LIBOR tracks
Eurodollars. See TIMOTHY Q. COOK & ROBERT K. LAROCHE, FED. RESERVE BANK FOR
RICHMOND, INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET, 48–51 (7th ed. 1993).
40. The Pound Sterling (GPB), U.S. Dollar (USD), Japanese Yen (JPY), Swiss
Franc (CHF), Canadian Dollar (CAD), Australian Dollar (AUD), Euro (EUR), Danish
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To calculate these rates, the BBA created a “panel” of banks for
each currency.43 Depending on the currency, the number of banks on
each panel ranged from six to 18.44 Participation in panels was
voluntary,45 but the BBA claimed that all significant London traders
participated in their respective LIBOR panels, and panel participants
contributed to most of the inter-bank lending in London.46
Every day, panel banks reported to the BBA their estimate
regarding what rate they could borrow funds in their panel’s currency
for the 15 tenors LIBOR tracked.47 The BBA then excluded the top 25%
and bottom 25% of the reported rates, and averaged the remaining
50%.48 This weighted average then became the LIBOR rate for the
panel’s currency.49 The BBA repeated this process for all of the
currencies, and reported their conclusion to Thomas Reuters who
published all of the rates at 11 a.m. London time.50
The rates that banks reported were not the rates at which they
actually borrowed money.51 Very often, amongst the 150 LIBOR rates,
no actual trades took place.52 Rather, the reported rates were just the
banks’ estimates regarding what rate they could borrow should they
desire to obtain funds.53 Similarly, BBA LIBOR did not attempt to
measure how much it cost banks to borrow funds in a currency’s home

Kroner (DKK), Swedish Krona (SEK) and New Zealand Dollar (NZD). See BBA
REPORT, supra note 6, § 3.4.
41. Overnight, one week (1W), two week (2W), one month (1Mo) and every
month afterwards until 12 months (12Mo). See WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, at
Chart 6.13.
42. See id.
43. See id. § 5.20. The USD panel includes in part the Bank of Tokyo –
Mitsubishi, Barclays Bank plc, Deutsche Bank AG HBOS, HSBC, Lloyds, TSB Bank
plc, Rabobank and the Royal Bank of Canada.
44. See id.
45. See id. § 3.1.
46. See id. § 8.3.
47. See id. § 12.2.
48. See id. § 10.1.
49. See id.
50. See id. § 3.3. The BBA notes that not every bank is willing to lend to every
other bank and that these rates generally only available to other banks that have open
lines of credit. See id. § 6.10.
51. See id. § 12.2.
52. See WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, at Chart 4.A.
53. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 12.2.
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country.54 Rather, BBA LIBOR attempted to measure how much it
costs banks to borrow in London.55
B. LIBOR’S IMPORTANCE
In 2008, almost all subprime adjustable rate mortgages in the
United States56 and approximately 50% of all private student loans in the
United States were linked to LIBOR.57 As of May 2012, almost 45% of
prime adjustable rate mortgages and close to 80% of subprime
adjustable rate mortgages were linked to LIBOR.58 A minor difference
in LIBOR, such as 0.3 percentage points, can result in a $100 increase in
the monthly payment on a $500,000 adjustable rate mortgage.59
Moreover, approximately $9 trillion dollars in corporate debt was linked
to LIBOR.60 According to one estimate, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
lost $3 billion due to the LIBOR scandal.61
LIBOR use is not limited to the private sector; governments also
used LIBOR.62 The U.S. government used LIBOR when bailing out

54.
55.

See id. §§ 7.1–7.6.
See id. § 3.1. The BBA acknowledges that there are banks that are not included
in LIBOR panels because they do participate in the London money market. See id. §§
8.3–8.4.
56. See Guhan Venkatu, How Many U.S. Mortgages Are Linked to Libor?, FED.
RESERVE
BANK
OF
CLEVELAND
(July
10,
2012),
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/trends/2012/0712/01banfin.cfm.
57. Ben Levisohn & Lauren Young, The Lowdown on Libor, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK,
May
28,
2008,
available
at
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-05-28/the-lowdown-on-libor.
58. See Venkatu, supra note 56.
59. See Sara Munez, The Libor Investigation: How Libor Affects Rates on Loans,
WALL ST. J., July 5, 2012, at A5.
60. See Carrick Mollenkamp, Serena Ng, Laurence Norman & James R. Hagerty,
Libor’s Rise May Sock Many Borrowers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB120856108868827857.
61. See Clea Benson, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Libor Loss Tops $3 Billion in
Audit, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-1219/fannie-mae-freddie-mac-libor-loss-tops-3-billion-auditor-says.html.
62. See In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 935 F. Supp. 2d 666
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); Darrell Preston, Rigged Libor Hits States-Localities With $6 Billion:
Muni Credit, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-1009/rigged-libor-hits-states-localities-with-6-billion-muni-credit.html.
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AIG in its Toxic Asset Relief Program (“TARP”)63 and at least five
states may have used LIBOR in connection with their pension funds.64
One expert estimated that approximately 75% of major cities have
outstanding contracts with ties to LIBOR.65
C. HOW LIBOR WAS MANIPULATED
Starting in the middle of 2005, Barclays, a major British bank,
made numerous false LIBOR submissions to the BBA.66 Barclays
raised and lowered its reported LIBOR rates for two reasons. First,
Barclays did not want to appear less creditworthy than its peers.67
Second, Barclays wanted to generate profits for its derivate
department.68
A difference of 1 basis point in LIBOR can result in several million
dollars of profit for a major bank.69 To capitalize on these minor
differences, Barclays’s derivative department regularly dictated to the
bank’s cash department what LIBOR rate the bank should report.70 At

63. See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 174–77 (2012).
64. See David McLaughlin, Libor Manipulation Probed by Five State Legal
Offices, BLOOMBERG (July 17, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0716/libor-manipulation-investigated-by-new-york-connecticut.html; Nathaniel Popper,
Banks Face Suits as States Weigh Libor Losses, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/05/business/banks-facing-suits-as-states-weigh-theirlibor-losses.html?_r=1&#038;ref=business.
65. See Nathaniel Popper, Rate Scandal Stirs Scramble for Damages, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK, July 10, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/10/libor-rate-riggingscandal-sets-off-legal-fights-for-restitution.
66. See CFTC, Gensler Remarks, supra note 4.
67. See EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBOR:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 5 (2012).
68. See id.
69. See Philip Thomas, Libor Lessons, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2013,
http://www.ftadviser.com/2013/10/09/investments/economic-indicators/libor-lessons.oVUsJze4WmgSz1L8m763SK/article-1.html.
70. For example, traders sent emails saying “[w]e have another big fixing
tom[orrow] and with the market more I was hoping we could set 1M and 3M Libors as
high as possible,” or “Pls ask [submitter] to get 1m set to 82.” The submitters
frequently responded with responses such as “leave it with me Sir,” or “done . . . for
you big boy.” See In re Barclays PLC, CFTC Docket No. 12-25, 2012 WL 2500330, at
*8–9 (June 27, 2012).
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this point, Barclays did not even prevent its derivative traders and rate
submitters from communicating with each other.71
UBS, Royal Bank of Scotland (“RBS”), and Dutch Rabobank also
manipulated LIBOR for their own profit.72 In an apparent lack of
oversight, UBS made its derivative traders in charge of submitting
LIBOR quotes.73 One senior trader at UBS then developed relationships
with employees at four other banks in order to coordinate false LIBOR
submissions.74 In total, UBS traders made approximately 2,000 requests
to manipulate LIBOR.75
To further perpetuate the fraud, UBS asked broker-dealers to
disseminate false LIBOR information amongst banks.76 UBS then
rewarded these broker dealers by executing wash-trades, or trades that
have no purpose other than to generate fees for the broker.77
D. EARLY WARNINGS SIGNS AND RESPONSES TO LIBOR BEING
MANIPULATED
There were many potential warnings of LIBOR fraud.78 Towards
the end of 2007, Barclays reported to the BBA that some panel banks
were submitting rates that were far below market conditions.79 On May
20, 2008, the N.Y. Fed privately claimed to have heard from several
Eurodollar brokers that banks were bidding for funds on the open
market up to 25 basis points above the rates they submitted to the

71. See Timeline: Libor-Fixing Scandal, BBC NEWS (Feb. 6, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18671255 [hereinafter BBC, Timeline].
72. See CFTC, Gensler Remarks, supra note 4.
73. See In re UBS AG, CFTC Docket No. 13-09, 2012 WL 6642376, at *5–6 (Dec.
19, 2012).
74. For instance, one trader asked “strange request [I] know but can we go for a
high 6m fix but a low 7m fix pls.” Another trader asked “[c]an we pls go for lower
Libors tonight, across all tenors (1m 3m and 6m) much appreciated.” The submitter
responded “[w]ill do.” See id.
75. See id.
76. See id., at *2.
77. See id. at *27–29.
78. See infra notes 79–84.
79. See CFTC, Gensler Remarks, supra note 4.
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BBA.80 A week later, the Wall Street Journal published an article
questioning LIBOR’s accuracy.81
According to Geithner, the Bank of England,82 SEC, and CFTC
were informed about potentially false LIBOR submission in 2008.83
Soon after, numerous academic studies were published attempting to
determine if banks were falsifying their submissions.84 It appears,
however, that only the CFTC seriously looked into allegations of false
LIBOR submissions and, despite an ongoing and open investigation into
UBS, the CFTC only discovered the false submissions after UBS
launched its own internal investigation.85
Partially in response to media claims of LIBOR being manipulated,
on June 10, 2008, the BBA published a comprehensive report analyzing
LIBOR and how to create a more accurate benchmark.86 The BBA
added a scrutiny mechanism and other minor changes to LIBOR.87
Then, on November 2, 2009, the BBA circulated guidelines for
submitting LIBOR rates.88 Unfortunately, approximately a month later
when Barclays began to improve its own internal LIBOR controls, it
ignored the BBA’s guidelines.89

80.
81.

See CHEUN & RASKIN, supra note 12.
Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, Study Casts Doubt on Key Rate WSJ Analysis
Suggests Banks May Have Reported Flawed Interest Data for Libor, WALL ST. J., May
29, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB121200703762027135.
82. See E-mail from Timothy Geitner to Mervyn King (June 1, 2008), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2012/libor/June_1_2008_LIBO
R_recommendations.pdf.
83. See CFTC, Gensler Remarks, supra note 4.
84. See, e.g., Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Michael Kraten, Albert D. Metz & Gim S.
Seow, Libor Manipulation?, 36 J. OF BANKING & FIN. 136 (2012)
85. See CFTC, Gensler Remarks, supra note 4.
86. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6. The BBA subsequently published an
Understanding LIBOR paper in 2010 and 2012. See BBA, UNDERSTANDING THE
CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF BBA LIBOR (2010); BBA, UNDERSTANDING THE
CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF BBA LIBOR (2012). However, these reports were
not comprehensive and did not fully analyze LIBOR.
87. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 13.3.
88. See BBC, Timeline, supra note 71.
89. See id.
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E. RESULTS OF LIBOR MANIPULATIONS
On June 27, 2012, the CFTC ordered Barclays to pay a $200
million penalty.90 In addition, the Justice Department fined Barclays
$160 million, and the FSA91 fined Barclays £59.5 million.92 Similarly,
UBS and RBS paid approximately $1.5 billion and $612 million,
respectively, in restitution to regulators.93
ICAP, the largest
international broker dealer, agreed to pay approximately $87 million in
fines for helping banks coordinate false submissions.94
On July 31, 2012, Deutsche Bank admitted that some of its staff
members had engaged in LIBOR rigging.95 As of September 2012, 19
banks worldwide were under investigation for manipulating LIBOR
rates.96 Recently, in conjunction with other regulators, the U.S.

90. See Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Orders Barclays to Pay $200 Million Penalty
for Attempted Manipulation of and False Reporting Concerning LIBOR and Euribor
Benchmark
Interest
Rates
(July
27,
2012),
available
at
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6289-12 [hereinafter CFTC, Barclays
Penalty].
91. The Financial Service Authority (“FSA”) is an independent U.K. nongovernmental body given statutory powers by the U.K. Financial Services and Markets
Act of 2000, and which regulates most financial services markets, exchanges and firms
in the U.K. FSA is funded by the firms it regulates and is accountable to U.K. Treasury
Ministers and Parliament. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c.8 (Eng.).
92. See CFTC, Barclays Penalty, supra note 90.
93. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, UBS Securities Japan Co. Ltd. to Plead
Guilty to Felony Wire Fraud for Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR Benchmark
Interest
Rates
(Dec.
19,
2012),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-ag-1522.html; Press Release, CFTC,
CFTC Orders UBS to Pay $700 Million Penalty to Settle Charges of Manipulation,
Attempted Manipulation and False Reporting of LIBOR and Other Benchmark Interest
Rates (Dec. 19, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/
pr6472-12; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, RBS Securities Japan Limited Agrees to
Plead Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of Libor Benchmark
Interest Rates (Feb. 16, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/
February/13-crm-161.html.
94. See Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Charges ICAP Europe Limited, a Subsidiary
of ICAP plc, with Manipulation and Attempted Manipulation of Yen Libor (Sept. 25,
2013), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6708-13.
95. See BBC, Timeline, supra note 71.
96. See Enrich & Colchester, supra note 36.
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Department of Justice fined Dutch Rabobank approximately $1 billion
dollars for 500 attempts to manipulating LIBOR.97
On December 12, 2012, the BBA announced that pursuant to the
Wheatley Review, it was abolishing most LIBOR rates.98 Starting in
May 2013, instead of collecting 150 LIBOR rates, the BBA would only
collect 37 rates.99 Similarly, the BBA announced that it agreed to
suggestion number 3 of the Wheatley Review and it would sell
LIBOR.100 On July 9, 2013, after an auction with the London Stock
Exchange Group and Thomson Reuters, NYSE EuroNext purchased
LIBOR for $1.101 It is expected that NYSE EuroNext will fully take
over LIBOR in early 2014.102
II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS: THE BBA REPORT, WHEATLEY REVIEW,
AND LIBOR ALTERNATIVES
In 2008, after allegations of LIBOR rigging first surfaced, the BBA
launched a comprehensive review of the benchmark.103 Similarly, in
response to the Barclays scandal, U.K. regulators launched a
comprehensive investigation into LIBOR.104 The investigation was
headed by Martin Wheatley and eventually published as The Wheatley
97. See Dutch Rabobank Fined $1 Bbillion Over Libor Scandal, REUTERS (Oct. 29,
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/29/us-rabobank-libor-id
USBRE99S0L520131029.
98. See
BBA,
STRENGTHENING
LIBOR—PROPOSAL
TO
IMPLEMENT
RECOMMENDATION NUMBER 6 OF ‘THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR’ (2012),
available
at
http://www.bba.org.uk/downloads/bba/Streamline_Consultation.pdf
[hereinafter BBA, STRENGTHENING LIBOR].
99. The tenors are EUR same day 1wk and 1m, the USD, CHF, EUR, GBP,JPY in
the overnight, 1wk, 1m, 2m, 3m, 6m and 12m tenors. See id. However, the Wheatley
Review called for the abolishment of 130 LIBOR rates and the BBA announced that it
plans to abolish only 108 rates. See WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17.
100. See Press Release, BBA, BBA Statement on Wheatley Review of LIBOR
(Sept. 25, 2012), available at http://www.bbalibor.com/news-releases/bba-statementon-wheatley-review-of-libor.
101. Brooke Master & Philip Stafford, Scandal-Plagued Libor Moves to NYSE, FIN.
TIMES, July 9, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/73332222-e87f-11e2-aead00144feabdc0.html#axzz2iw85Hm61.
102. See Press Release, NYSE EuroNext, NYSE EuroNext Subsidiary to Become
New Administrator of LIBOR (July 9, 2013), available at http://www.nyse.com/
press/1373365567815.html.
103. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6.
104. See WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, §1.3.

468

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XIX

Review of LIBOR: Final Report.105 The Wheatley investigation team
considered abolishing LIBOR and using an alternative benchmark.106
Ultimately, however, the Wheatley Review decided not to abandon
LIBOR.107 Other regulators disagreed and many other commentators are
attempting to find LIBOR substitutes.108
Part II of this Comment will first explain the BBA Report and the
Wheatley Review.
Part II will then analyze and explain the
characteristics of a fair and accurate benchmark. Finally, Part II will
evaluate some of the commonly proposed alternatives to LIBOR.
A. THE BBA REPORT
On June 10, 2008, the BBA published a report analyzing LIBOR.109
The report reviewed LIBOR and addressed claims that banks were
The BBA’s report also affirmed its
rigging the benchmark.110
commitment to several key characteristics of LIBOR.111
1. How LIBOR Is Calculated
The BBA Report affirmed its commitment to how LIBOR is
calculated.112 LIBOR is defined as “the rate at which an individual
contributor panel bank could borrow funds, were it to do so by asking
for and the accepting inter-bank offers in reasonable market size, just
prior to 11.00 London time.”113 The BBA rejected two possible
changes, detailed below.114

105.
106.
107.
108.

See id.
See infra notes 196–199.
See id.
See Kevin Costelloe, Bernanke Says Alternatives to Libor Being Considered,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-25/bernankesays-alternatives-to-libor-being-considered.html.
109. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6.
110. See id.
111. See infra notes 112–129 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 115–122 and accompanying text.
113. BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 12.2.
114. See infra notes 115–121 and accompanying text.
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a. Prime Versus Actual Bank
Prior to 1998, banks were asked to provide the rate at which a
“prime bank” would lend to another prime bank.115 This definition,
however, led to confusion as to which banks are defined as “prime
banks.”116 Therefore, in 1998, the BBA changed LIBOR to its current
definition which asks panel banks to estimate their own costs of
borrowing—not those of a hypothetical prime bank.117 This was
intended to create a more accurate LIBOR by reflecting the true cost of
borrowing funds.118
b. Reasonable Market Size
In addition, the BBA refused to define reasonable market size.119
For LIBOR submissions, banks are asked to calculate rates based upon a
loan of “reasonable market size.”120 Since different currencies and
tenors have wide ranges of liquidity, the BBA felt that no set
denomination could accurately define reasonable market size amongst
all 150 LIBOR rates.121 Therefore, the BBA deliberately let each bank
independently determine what amounts to reasonable market size.122
2. Transparency
Each individual bank’s rate is published alongside the overall
LIBOR average.123 The BBA acknowledged that if a bank publishes a
rate that is higher than its peers, market participants may perceive the

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 12.2.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. § 12.3.
See id.
See id.
See id. Economics dictate that lending a larger sum of money is a greater risk
then lending a smaller sum of money. Accordingly, the cost of borrowing also reflects
the amount of funds borrowed. By not specifying the amount of funds borrowed,
LIBOR fails to take this into account. See Dennis Kuo, David Skeie & James Vickery,
A Comparison of Libor to Other Measures of Bank Borrowing Costs 8 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of N.Y., Working Paper, 2012).
123. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 11.1.
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banks with the higher rate as having a shortage of funds.124 As a result,
to avoid this perception, banks have an incentive to misreport their costs
of borrowing and exhibit “herd behavior.”125
In reality, there may be a number of valid explanations that have
nothing to do with a shortage of funds and explain why a bank is willing
to pay more than its peers for credit.126 For example, the borrowing
bank may be a foreign bank and have less natural access to the
underlying currency through deposits.127 This requires the bank to
borrow in the inter-bank market to obtain the desired currency.128
To minimize banks incentive to misreport and appear weak, the
BBA considered hiding individual banks’ submissions and only
publishing the overall LIBOR rate.129 Ultimately, however, the BBA
rejected this proposal.130 In the interests of promoting transparency, the
BBA in its 2008 report decided to continue its policy of releasing
individual bank data.131
3. Accuracy of LIBOR
The BBA recognized that not every bank can borrow funds at the
posted LIBOR rate.132 Banks will generally only lend to another bank if
the borrowing bank has an open line of credit with the lending
institution.133 If a borrowing bank does not have an open line of credit
with the lender, the borrowing bank may not be able to borrow funds or
only be able to borrow funds at a higher rate.134 This reflects the BBA’s
opinion that LIBOR panels are composed of the most credit-worthy
banks.135
The BBA report further noted that LIBOR reflects the rate it costs
banks to borrow in an underlying currency, without any references to
124.
125.
126.
127.

See id.
Banks look at other banks before submitting quotes. See id.
See Kuo, Skeie & Vickery, supra, note 122, at 7.
See id.; see also John C. Hull & Alan White, LIBOR vs. OIS: The Derivatives
Discounting Dilemma, 11 J. INV. MGMT. 3, 16 (2013).
128. Id.
129. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 11.1.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. See id. § 6.10.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See BBA REPORT, at 1.
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other currency.136 This can lead to market distortions.137 A bank can
borrow U.S. dollars at the USD LIBOR rate and then convert its dollars
on the Foreign Exchange (“FX”)138 market to Euros.139 The resulting
Euros may be cheaper than the corresponding EUR LIBOR.140
Conversely, banks wishing to lend out Euros and obtain U.S. dollars
may have to pay more than the EUR LIBOR rate.141
4. Safeguards Against Fraud
The BBA seemed to rely primarily on three mechanisms to prevent
fraud: (1) separating banks’ cash from derivative departments; (2)
expanding LIBOR panels; and (3) scrutiny mechanisms.142 Ultimately,
each of these mechanisms failed.143
a. Separation of Departments
To avoid fraudulent submissions, the BBA report claimed that
panel banks’ quotes should come from their cash department, not their
derivative department.144 Furthermore, the two departments should be
prevented from communicating with a “Chinese wall.”145 Most likely,
the intent of the proposal was to prevent derivative traders, who would
benefit from manipulating LIBOR rates, from engaging in the bank’s
LIBOR submission process.

136.
137.
138.

See id. §§ 7.1–7.6.
See id.
Foreign Exchange markets are where currencies are traded. See MARC
LEVINSON, THE ECONOMIST—GUIDE TO FINANCIAL MARKETS 14–16 (4th ed. 2006).
139. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, §§ 7.1–7.6.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See infra notes 144–153 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 66–102 and accompanying text.
144. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 12.2.
145. See id.
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b. Expansion of Contributing Panel
The BBA stated that panel banks were good representations of the
London market and no new banks wished to join the panels.146
Moreover, the BBA claimed that LIBOR participants make up most of
the trading in London147 and all significant London traders participated
in their respective LIBOR panels.148 The BBA report did, however,
consider adding non-contributing banks to the panel.149
c. Scrutiny Mechanism
The BBA also developed a “scrutiny mechanism” to ensure
LIBOR’s accuracy.150 The BBA designed this mechanism to check
banks’ daily submissions for discrepancies.151 If a discrepancy is
noticed, the submitting bank is given the opportunity to provide an
explanation.152 In the event a bank is unable to give an adequate
explanation, the banks receive a warning and repeat offenders are
removed from the panel.153
5. Limits of the BBA Report
The BBA report was well intended; however, it had some
limitations.154 Notably, LIBOR was still based on estimates—not real
trades.155 In addition, the BBA also had no legal authority to prevent
frauds.156

146. See id. § 13.3. At the time of the BBA report there were only 16 banks on the
USD LIBOR panel. Currently, there are 18 banks on the panel. Kuo, Skeie & Vickery,
supra note 122, at 5.
147. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 8.4.
148. See id. § 3.1.
149. See id. § 13.3.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id. §§ 7.1–7.6.
154. See infra notes 156–167 and accompanying text.
155. See Wong, supra note 22, at 379.
156. See MUTKIN & LIN, supra note 32.
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a. Basing LIBOR on Real Transactions
After the BBA report, the BBA continued to base LIBOR rates
upon contributing banks’ estimates, not actual borrowing rates.157 Panel
banks submit LIBOR rates up to the fifth decimal point.158 In practice,
trades are quoted and executed to the third or fourth decimal point.159
By not basing submissions on actual trade data, banks can strategically
misreport rates.160
Basing LIBOR on actual trades would result in a more accurate and
transparent rate.161 When an actual trade takes place, there is a
counterparty that can verify the price paid.162 The overall LIBOR can
then be weighted to accommodate for different volumes of trades.163
However, there is a problem with basing LIBOR on actual
transactions.164 Many of the 150 LIBOR rates have low or no amounts
of daily trading.165 It is difficult to base submissions on real trades when
very little trades are actually taking place.166 This might result in banks
being unable to give accurate LIBOR quotes.167 Moreover, due to the
very little trading, one large trade by a single market participant can
significantly affect the overall LIBOR rate.168

157.
158.

Wong, supra note 22, at 379.
See, e.g., Historical Libor Rates, BBA, http://www.bbalibor.com/rates/
historical (last visited Dec. 1, 2013).
159. See, e.g., Three Month Sterling (Short Sterling) Futures, NYSE EURONEXT
GLOBAL
DERIVATIVES,
https://globalderivatives.nyx.com/contract/content/29101/contract-specification
(last
visited Dec. 1, 2013); Six-Month Euroyen LIBOR Futures, TOKYO FIN. EXCH. INC.,
http://www.tfx.co.jp/en/products/libor.shtml (last visited Dec. 1, 2013).
160. Wong, supra note 22, at 379.
161. See CFTC, Gensler Remarks, supra note 4.
162. See McNulty, supra note 21.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, §§ 4.12–4.13.
166. See id. § 4.11.
167. See id.
168. See id.
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b. Lack of Authority
The BBA is a non-profit organization.169 If banks deliberately lie
or mislead investors, the BBA has no real authority to impose sanctions
or penalties.170 The only way the BBA can punish banks is to publicly
humiliate them.171 Accordingly, banks have little to fear of being caught
manipulating LIBOR.172
B. WHEATLEY REVIEW
In September 2012, the Wheatley Review of LIBOR: Final Report
was published.173 This review represents U.K. regulators’ response to
the LIBOR scandal.174 The review also included suggestions on how to
strengthen LIBOR.175 On October 17, 2012, the U.K. Parliament
announced that it planned to adopt the Wheatley Review suggestions.176
Similarly, the BBA announced that it accepted the Wheatley Review
and plans to implement its suggestions.177
1. A New Institution
The BBA acts as a lobbying group for the same banks submitting
LIBOR quotes.178 In 2008, when the BBA CEO Angela Knight
expressed hesitation over the BBA’s role in monitoring LIBOR and
suggested selling the benchmark, panel banks vetoed the BBA’s
suggestion.179 Recognizing this inherent conflict of interest, the
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 1.2.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
HM TREASURY, WRITTEN MINISTERIAL STATEMENT, WHEATLEY REVIEW OF
LIBOR (Oct. 17, 2012), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20130129110402/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/wms_fst_171012.pdf.
177. See BBA, STRENGTHENING LIBOR, supra note 98.
178. WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, § 3.2
179. Enrich & Colchester, supra note 36; see also Philip Stafford, Thomson Reuters
to Refocus After Libor Loss, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/
s/0/3c0f8ccc-2777-11e3-ae16-00144feab7de.html#axzz2iw85Hm61 (estimating that the
BBA made $1,500,000 annually from LIBOR).
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Wheatley Review stated that the BBA is not the proper authority to
govern LIBOR and another institution should take on the BBA’s current
role in governing LIBOR.180
In addition, to further protect LIBOR, the new institution should
create an independent oversight committee that represents a crosssection of all users, or industry bodies that represent users, of LIBOR.181
This committee, similar to the independent committees of corporate
boards, would ensure the integrity of the new institution and report
major infractions to the Financial Service Authority (“FSA”).182 The
committee would also have the authority to enforce low-level infractions
such as operating problems.183
2. Regulatory Overview of the New Institution
Currently, there is no direct regulatory scheme over LIBOR.184 All
government-related actions are being pursued in the context of other
regulatory frameworks.185 This results in insufficient oversight of
LIBOR.186 Accordingly, there needs to be a regulatory body overseeing
LIBOR.187 The review assumes that the FSA would be the appropriate
regulatory body.188
The report notes that increasing regulation may increase costs on
banks.189 However, due to LIBOR’s importance, it is appropriate that
these costs be implemented.190 Moreover, once LIBOR is fixed, banks
will want to join because they get “prestige.”191 The regulatory cost is
further justified by the protection these new regulations provide the
public.192
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. §§ 3.2–3.5.
Id. § 3.36.
Id. § 3.35.
Id.
Id. § 2.4.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 2.5.
See id. §§ 2.6–2.7.
See id. § 2.20 (“Creating controlled functions for these activities may introduce
a modest burden on the individuals involved, and will also involve some additional cost
for the firms.”).
190. Id.
191. Id. § 5.26.
192. Id. § 2.20.
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3. Extension of Civil Actions
Currently, civil suits protect consumers from abusive financial
instruments and products.193 Such suits, however, do not protect
consumers from benchmark manipulations.194 Therefore, to protect
consumers, the right to initiate civil suits against banks should be
extended to include charges of fraudulently manipulating benchmarks.195
4. Abolishing Rates
Of the 150 published LIBOR rates
thinly traded.196 In some currencies,
domestic benchmarks to LIBOR.197 To
Wheatley Review suggested that the
compiling data for 130 rates.198

prior to 2013, most were only
market participants preferred
ensure LIBOR’s accuracy, the
new institution should stop

5. Hiding Individual Banks’ Data
Individual bank submissions are currently published alongside
overall LIBOR rates.199 In an effort to promote a more accurate rate, the
BBA debated only publishing the overall LIBOR rates and keeping
individual bank submissions secret for a length of time.200 Ultimately,
the BBA rejected this proposal and continued to publish individual bank
rates.201 This policy led to banks submitting false rates so that market

193.
194.
195.
196.

See id. § 2.30.
See id.
See id. § 2.31.
See id. § 5.5 (namely, the USD, Pound Sterling, Swiss Franc, Japanese Yen and
the Euro in the overnight, 1Mo, 3Mo, 6Mo and 12Mo tenors).
197. Id. § 5.6.
198. Id. § 5.9. According to the Wheatley Review, the following rates in the 4M,
5M, 7M, 8M, 10M and 11M tenors should be abolished: Australian Dollars, Canadian
Dollars, Danish Kroner, New Zealand Dollars and Swedish Kroner. Id. § 5.5. Market
participants can still estimate the abolished tenors by extrapolating from the published
tenors. Id. § 5.8. For example, based on the USD LIBOR 3Mo and USD LIBOR 6Mo,
a market participant can estimate 4Mo LIBOR. See id.
199. Id. § 5.14.
200. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 11.1
201. See id.
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participants would not perceive them as less creditworthy than their
peers.202
According to the Wheatley Review, banks can assume that their
peers’ rates do not significantly change on a daily basis.203 Banks can
then estimate how their submission will impact the overall LIBOR rate
and deliberately exclude their quote.204 Therefore, the Wheatley Review
recommends that individual banks keep their rates secret for three
months before they are published.205 This will allow banks not to worry
about day-to-day trading, and discourage rate manipulations.206
6. Increasing the Size of the LIBOR Panel
All banks and a large number of market participants enjoy the
benefits of LIBOR.207 Yet, only a small number of banks actually
contribute to the benchmark.208 Some large banks, in particular, are
notably absent from LIBOR panels.209
Increasing panel sizes will have two major effects.210 First, larger
panels will ensure that individual banks’ submissions have less of an
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See supra notes 76–92 and accompanying text.
WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, § 5.15.
See id. § 5.15.
Id.
See id.
Id. § 5.22.
Id.
Id. The BBA, however, claimed that it was unaware of any major banks in the
London market that do not currently participate in LIBOR. See BBA REPORT, supra
note 6, § 8.3. Perhaps the Wheatley Review is referring to major banks that do not have
major operations in London. The BBA currently does not require a panel bank to be
located in London; rather, the bank must trade in London. If non-London trading is
included in rate calculations, LIBOR has effectively changed. For example, USD
LIBOR measures Eurodollars and not U.S. Dollars. By adding major U.S. banks that
do not trade in London to LIBOR panels, the effective result is that LIBOR will be
measuring U.S. Dollars and Eurodollars combined. See id. §§ 8.1–8.7.
210. WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, § 5.23. The BBA noted that panel banks
are most likely the most credit-worthy and that, therefore, their cost of borrowing may
be lower than other banks. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, §§ 5.2–5.3. Essentially, the
BBA held that LIBOR is not an accurate reflection of what it costs banks to borrow
money in London. Id. Rather, it is a reflection of what it costs the most credit-worthy
banks in London to borrow money. Id. By increasing panel sizes to include more less
credit-worthy members, economics dictate, that the cost of borrowing goes up which
will be reflected in LIBOR rates. See BBA REPORT, supra note 6, § 8.4. By increasing
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effect on the overall LIBOR rate.211 Second, by increasing the number
of panel members, LIBOR will be more representative of banks as a
whole.212 The Wheatley Review concludes that international authorities
should encourage participation in LIBOR panels.213
The Wheatley Review goes further to state that if banks want to
leave their panels, or if panel sizes do not naturally increase, it might be
necessary to compel individual banks to participate in LIBOR panels
and pay the associated costs.214 This can be achieved through
international agreements where banks must participate in LIBOR if they
want to join inter-bank money markets.215 This sharply contrasts with
the BBA’s voluntary approach.216
7. Records
Currently, panel banks do not have to keep records of their trade
data.217 This makes it difficult to determine if banks’ quotes accurately
reflect their cost of borrowing.218 To ensure LIBOR’s accuracy, banks
should be required to keep records of their real-life trades.219 By
comparing post hoc the quotes submitted by banks and the rates that the
banks actually paid, the new institution will be able to ensure that banks
are accurately reporting their cost of borrowing.220
8. Separating Banks’ Trading and Cash Desks
Similar to the BBA report, the Wheatley Review states that traders
should be provided with training describing what types of contacts with
a LIBOR submitter are proper.221 To ensure that improper contacts do
panel sizes, market participants may assume that LIBOR is “more accurate” when in
reality LIBOR is just measuring a different benchmark. See id. §§ 8.1–8.7.
211. WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, § 5.23.
212. Id.
213. Id. § 5.24. The Report, however, gives no criteria on how new banks should be
selected to join LIBOR.
214. See id. § 5.27.
215. See id.
216. See supra notes 107–111.
217. See WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, § 4.24.
218. See id. §§ 4.24–4.25.
219. Id. § 4.25.
220. Id. § 4.26.
221. Id. § 4.20.
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not take place, banks should be required to keep records of any contact
between their traders and their cash desk.222 Separating the two
departments makes it less likely that banks will submit false rates.223
9. The Effect on Existing Contracts
The Wheatley Review briefly addressed the effects its
recommendations would have on existing contracts.224 Most swaps that
are tied to LIBOR contain provisions in the event a fixing is
unavailable.225 Such provisions were inserted into contracts with the
understanding that something may disrupt market operations and
prevent the BBA from publishing a daily LIBOR rate.226 Most of these
provisions revolve around contract holders contacting a series of
reference banks for inter-bank quotes and then averaging the
results.227This approach, however, is unworkable.228 Due to the sheer
volume of contracts that reference LIBOR, it is impractical for every
party in a contract to contact multiple banks.229 Moreover, many of the
reference banks used to determine this provision rate are the same banks
that participate in LIBOR panels.230 If LIBOR panel banks are
submitting false rates to the BBA, it seems likely they would submit
false rates to individuals who contact them and ask for sensitive trading
information.231
C. ALTERNATIVES TO LIBOR
Many commentators discuss using alternative benchmarks to
LIBOR.232
Unfortunately, there appears to be no obvious

222.
223.

Id.
See id.; see also CFTC, Gensler Remarks, supra note 4 (allowing derivative
traders to submit LIBOR quotes resulted in false submissions).
224. See WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, § 5.30.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. § 5.31.
228. Id. § 5.32.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See id.
232. See infra notes 269–307 and accompanying text.
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replacement.233 No single substitute can replace all of LIBOR’s uses,
and it appears that there is some market inertia involved with using
LIBOR.234 This Part will describe the characteristics of an ideal
benchmark. It will then describe some of the challenges in crafting a
new benchmark. Finally, this Part will briefly explore some of the more
commonly cited LIBOR alternatives.
1. The Ideal Benchmark
An ideal benchmark is fair, accurate, and available to market
participants in non-discriminatory commercial terms.235 Unfortunately,
different types of benchmarks have different vulnerabilities.236
Transaction based benchmarks can be manipulated by market
participants in the underlying market, and survey based benchmarks are
vulnerable to inaccurate submission.237
The ownership and distribution of benchmarked data can also
potentially make a benchmark unfair to some market participants.238 For
example, if a benchmark is the intellectual property of an individual,
organization, or company, the owner of the benchmark may only allow
select individuals access to the information.239 The benchmark’s owner
may also charge prohibitive fees for access to the information.240
A credible benchmark has several key characteristics.241 First, the
benchmark must be representative of the underlying market.242 Second,
233. See Randall Palmer, Central Bankers Eyeing Whether Libor Needs Scrapping,
REUTERS (July 19, 2012) http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/19/us-banking-liboridUSBRE86H1IV20120719 (quoting the Governor of the Bank of Canada: “If it’s
structurally flawed and can’t be fixed—which is a possibility—there may need to be
different types of approaches, and we need to think that through”).
234. See MUTKIN & LIN, supra note 32.
235. See WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, § 7.13.
236. Id. § 7.12.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. § 7.13.
240. See id.; see also Brody Mullins, Michael Rothfeld, Tom McGinty & Jenny
Strasburg, Traders Pay for an Early Peek at Key Data, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873246822045785159631914216
02 (investors can pay large fees to obtain access to the Michigan Consumer Sentiment
Index five minutes prior to the public market).
241. WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, §. 7.13.
242. Id.
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the institution administering the benchmark must publish transparent
rules describing the methodology it uses to calculate the benchmark.243
Third, the organization must provide the benchmark in a fair and nondiscriminatory way to all market participants.244 Finally, the benchmark
must be subject to credible oversight that prevents manipulation.245
2. Domestic U.S. Dollar Benchmark
LIBOR is based on Eurodollars, not U.S. dollars.246 This may be
causing U.S. borrowers to pay a premium on their loans so that foreign
banks have access to U.S. dollars.247 If there were an accurate
benchmark measuring inter-bank loans between U.S. banks, loans based
upon this benchmark would, most likely, more accurately reflect the true
cost of borrowing in the United States.248 Accordingly, any LIBOR
alternative should be based on U.S. Dollars.249
3. Regulation
Whatever new benchmark is proposed, it needs to be regulated to
avoid manipulation by insiders and banks.250 These regulations should
be comprehensive and include criminal, along with civil penalties for
intentional violations.251 The extent of how the new benchmark should
be regulated will depend on the method for calculating the new
benchmark.252

243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See VLADIMIR R. ROSSMAN & MORTON MOSKIN, COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS:
STRATEGIES FOR DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING § 16.04 (Linda I. Dole & A. Sidney
Holderness, Jr. eds., 2d ed. 2013).
247. See Kuo, Skeie & Vickery, supra note 122, at 7 (claiming that foreign banks
and U.S. bank’s foreign subsidiaries may have to pay more for funds than U.S. parent
banks. As a result, LIBOR and U.S. domestic lending rates are affected.).
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, §§ 7.16–7.23.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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4. The New York Funding Rate Fiasco
In 2008, amid public outrage surrounding possible LIBOR rate
manipulation, ICAP, a competitor of BBA, launched the New York
Funding Rate (“NYFR”).253 As conceived, the NYFR was a new
benchmark reflecting what it costs to borrow U.S. dollars in the United
States.254 To provide an accurate benchmark, the NYFR intended to
have a large panel consisting of 35 to 50 banks, and it would include
other sources of funding that are not covered by LIBOR.255
Furthermore, the new benchmark would only include 1-month and 3month tenors, and it would require a minimum of 24 participants to set a
rate each day.256
In the first four months following the NYFR’s inception, the
average LIBOR-NYFR spread was 1.4 basis points.257 After Lehman
Brothers collapsed, the LIBOR-NYFR spread widened, with the NYFR
averaging 40 basis points above LIBOR.258 Throughout its history, the
NYFR was above LIBOR every day, except for five days.259
The NYFR’s life as a benchmark, however, was short lived.260 The
original requirement of 24 participants was reduced to 16, and then
again to 12.261 Finally, in 2012, ICAP announced it was discontinuing
the NYFR due to a lack of participation.262
The lesson from the NYFR is that without widespread market
acceptance, any LIBOR alternative will be difficult to implement.263
Regulators cannot force market participants to use a given benchmark
when drafting contracts.264 In addition, market participants may be used
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See Cheun, supra note 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Kuo, Skeie & Vickery, supra note 122.
See id.
Liz Capo McCormick, New York Funding Rate Quells Libor Validity Concern
BIS Says, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 2, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=newsarchive&sid=aA69THft0NcQ.
260. See ICAP Scraps Rate Fixing as Banks Reduce Participation, REUTERS (Aug.
3, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/03/icap-nyfr-rates-id
USL2E8J33FN20120803.
261. See id.
262. Id.
263. See MUTKIN & LIN, supra note 32.
264. Id.
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to using LIBOR, and wish to continue using the benchmark even though
they know it is flawed and filled with self-manipulating banks.265
5. Regulatory Arbitrage
While laws can be passed requiring banks to participate in a
benchmark, there may be significant opposition from banks.266 This
might lead to banks conducting their financing needs abroad and away
from U.S. regulators.267 Without any financial gain, banks may not
voluntary agree to participate in any benchmark.268
6. Effective Federal Fund Rate
Banks are required to keep minimum reserves with the Federal
Reserve.269 Bank reserves are based on a 14 day average,270 and banks
borrow funds from each other in order maintain their minimum deposit
requirements.271 Two banks that engage in a transaction report their
trade to the Federal Reserve, which transfers the funds from the lending
bank’s account to the borrowing bank’s account.272 At the end of the
day, the Federal Reserve averages the day’s trades and compiles the data
into the effective federal fund rate, or the rate that banks lend each other
unsecured overnight funds in the U.S.273 Since the effective federal fund
265.
266.

Id.
See Nick Cawley, Euribor Fears Rise as Rate-Setting Panel Shrinks, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 9, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323442
804578231842932502354?mg=reno64-wsj (banks will leave panels if they do not
perceive a benefit of being a member); Katharina Bart & Marc Jones, UBS Departure
Deals Euribor Fresh Blow, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/03/19/us-ubs-euribor-idUSBRE92I0BR20130319.
267. See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 244 (2010)
(claiming that when the same transaction receives different regulatory treatment under
different regulatory regimes, there is a likelihood of regulatory arbitrage.).
268. See Bart & Jones, supra note 267.
269. Federal Funds and Interest on Reserves, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. (Mar.
2013), http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed15.html.
270. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE, RESERVE MAINTENANCE MANUAL
17 (2013).
271. See Federal Funds and Interest on Reserves, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.
(Mar. 2013), http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed15.html.
272. Id.
273. Id. This should not be confused with the federal funds target rate which is
often reported in the news and is a number determined by the Federal Reserve where
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rate is an accurate measure for unsecured overnight loans, it may be an
appropriate substitute for some of LIBOR uses.274
The effective federal fund rate, however, only measures overnight
rates and does not measure longer tenors.275 Furthermore, the Federal
Reserve’s decision regarding interest payments on deposits276 has had a
bigger effect on the effective federal fund rate than the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers.277 The Federal Reserve has also indicted that may
manipulate for economic reasons interest payouts.278 Accordingly, the
effective federal fund rate is an inadequate LIBOR alternative.279
7. OIS Swaps
Another possible LIBOR alternative is overnight index swaps
(“OIS”).280 These swaps are essentially long-term bets on the direction
of the effective federal fund rate that contract holders pay, or get paid,
based upon the difference between the effective federal fund rate and a
set interest rate.281 Market participants generally use these swaps to
extrapolate the effective federal fund rate beyond overnight tenors,282

the effective federal fund rate should be for policy and economic reasons. See Effective
Federal Funds Rate (DFF), FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS,
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DFF.
274. WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, § 6.32.
275. See id. § 6.29.
276. See Interest on Required Balances and Excess Balances, BD. OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Aug. 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/reqresbalances.htm.
277. See MORTEN L. BECH, CARL T. BERGSTROM, RODNEY J. GARRATT & MARTIN
ROSVALL, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORTS, MAPPING CHANGE
IN THE FEDERAL FUNDS MARKET (2011), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/
research/staff_reports/sr507.pdf.
278. See Sudeep Reedy, Bernanke: Lowering Interest Rate on Excess Reserves
Could Threaten Market Functioning, WALL ST. J. (July 22, 2010),
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2010/07/22/bernanke-lowering-interest-rate-on-excessreserves-could-threaten-market-functioning/.
279. WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, § 6.24, 6.28.
280. Id. § 6.32.
281. See Rajdeep Sengupta & Yu Man Tam, The LIBOR-OIS Spread As a Summary
Indicator, 25 ECON. SYNOPSES 1 (2008).
282. Id.
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and LCH.Clearnet, a large central clearing party, started using OIS
swaps as an alternative at the end of 2010.283
A disadvantage to OIS swaps is that because the notional amount,
or underlying funds, does not change hands, contract holders’ risks are
capped at an interest rate.284 In contrast, LIBOR transactions are real
loans where the underlying funds trade hands.285 This leads to there
being less credit risk in an OIS swap than a LIBOR loan.286
Another disadvantage to using OIS swaps as a LIBOR alternative is
the lack of a widely acceptable standard.287 Prior to 2013, OIS swaps
were over-the-counter trades with little regulation.288 As of the
beginning of 2013, there is no market-acceptable rate for these swaps.289
Therefore, OIS swaps are ultimately not effective alternatives to all
LIBOR contracts.290
8. Treasury Bonds
Instead of using LIBOR as a benchmark, market participants may
be able to use treasury notes as a benchmark.291 Treasury notes are
readily traded and there is an existing market for such notes.292 In
theory, U.S. treasury notes are not risk free.293 In practice, however,
market participants treat treasury notes as secured.294 This leads to
investors purchasing treasury notes to avoid market risks.295 During the
283. Press Release, LCH.Clearnet Adopts OIS Discounting for $218 Trillion IRS
Portfolio, LCH.CLEARNET (June 17, 2010), http://www.lchclearnet.com/media_centre
/press_releases/2010-06-17.asp.
284. WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, §§ 6.31–6.32.
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. Id. § 6.33.
288. See 17 C.F.R. § 50 (2013); see also Clearing Requirement Determination
Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,284, 74,285–86 (Dec. 13, 2012) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 50.).
289. WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, § 6.33.
290. See id. §§ 6.32–6.33.
291. Id. § 6.34.
292. See U.S. Treasury Bond Futures, CME GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com/
trading/interest-rates/us-treasury/30-year-us-treasury-bond.html (last visited Dec. 1,
2013).
293. WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, § 6.36.
294. Id.
295. Id.
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2008 financial crisis, treasury bonds were even negative at one point.296
Institutional investors, so fearful of depositing money in banks, were
willing to pay the government to safely hold their money.297 Due to this
excess liquidity and safety net, treasury notes do not accurately reflect
borrowing costs, and thus are not ideal substitutes for LIBOR.298
9. Exchange Based
When attempting to sell or buy a security, investors use exchanges
to find a counterparty.299 When the two parties agree on a price, the
exchange acts as a clearing system and the parties give the exchange
their security and payment. 300 The exchange then executes the trade and
transfers the security and its payment to its new owners. 301
Tabb and Grundfest propose creating a bank exchange where banks
can exchange inter-bank loans.302 Then, by recording all loans and
weighing for transaction size, an effective benchmark can be created.303
Furthermore, even when there is low volatility, by dividing the bid-ask
spread, a rate can be obtained.304
To ensure the benchmark’s accuracy, all bid and ask prices must be
“committed” (i.e., banks must commit themselves to go through with
such transaction).305 Alternatively, banks can be required to borrow or

296. Daniel Kruger & Cordell Eddings, Treasury Bills Trade at Negative Rates as
Haven Demand Surges, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?sid=aOGXsWKEI6F4&pid=newsarchive.
297. During the 2008 crisis, investors were fearful of depositing their money in
investment banks and instead fled to treasury notes. The result was that institutional
investors were willing to accept a negative yield in order to protect their money. See
David Gaffen, Three-Month Bill Yield Goes Negative, WALL ST. J. MARKETBEAT (Dec.
9, 2008), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2008/12/09/three-month-bill-yield-goesnegative/.
298. See WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 17, §§ 6.34–6.37.
299. See GEORGE ARNETT, GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKETS: NAVIGATING THE
WORLD’S EXCHANGES AND OTC MARKETS (2011).
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. See Tabb & Grundfest, supra note 22.
303. See id. at 256.
304. See id.
305. See id.
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lend at their quoted rates to a central fund.306 The central fund can then
use the proceeds from the bid-ask spread to pay for itself.307
III. CLEARINGHOUSE, EXCHANGE AND HYBRID BASED SOLUTIONS
Both the BBA and the Wheatley Review attempted to reform
LIBOR. The BBA was unsuccessful in its reforms, and the Wheatley
Review, although a step in the right direction, is not enough. Greater
reform and regulation of LIBOR is needed. Many of the alternatives
discussed in Part III are viable for some of the many uses of LIBOR.
Part III of this Comment will explore LIBOR alternatives that are not
mentioned in Part II, but that may be appropriate for some contracts.
A. CLEARINGHOUSE BASED
Under 17 C.F.R. § 50, all FX and fixed-to-interest rate swaps must
pass through a clearinghouse.308 The intent of 17 C.F.R. § 50 is to
remove these swaps from the shadow banking system and allow them to
be more closely regulated.309 However, the effect of 17 C.F.R. § 50 is
that all long-term LIBOR based swaps pass through a clearinghouse.310
Similarly, in order for banks to maintain minimum reserve
requirements, banks report overnight loans to the Federal Reserve.311
The central bank then transfers funds from between the two banks’
accounts and effectively acts as a clearinghouse.312
A similar
clearinghouse approach can also work for LIBOR.
Regulations can be adopted requiring all U.S. inter-bank loans to
pass through a clearinghouse.313 The clearinghouse can then calculate
the average interest rate, while weighing for loan size.314 The
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307.
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See id.
See 17 C.F.R. § 50 (2013).
See Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 77
Fed. Reg. 74,284, 74,284–87 (Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 50).
310. See id.
311. See supra notes 269–273 and accompanying text.
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313. See supra notes 213–216 and accompanying text (regulations can be passed
regarding how banks lend funds).
314. See US Dollar Index Futures, ICE, https://www.theice.com/productguide/
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clearinghouse system can then effectively measure interbank loans.315
This average can then be published as a LIBOR substitute.
Since any benchmark derived through this method is based on
actual trades, and not theoretical trades, such a benchmark would
accurately reflect banks’ true costs of borrowing.316 Furthermore,
because such a proposal measures U.S. trading and not EuroDollar
trading, it would more accurately reflect borrowing in the United
States.317 In addition, the USD LIBOR panel, under the BBA, is
comprised of only 18 banks, many of which are non-U.S. banks.318
Requiring all domestic banks to lend and borrow through a
clearinghouse would produce a much larger sample size, thereby
increasing the benchmark’s accuracy.319
As the NYFR fiasco showed, however, without a reward, banks
have little incentive to report their private data.320 If banks wanting to
borrow funds must report their transaction data, they might find it easier
to not borrow at all, or simply borrow overseas and avoid reporting
requirements.321 Banks also might only offer to lend at ridiculous
rates.322
B. EXCHANGE BASED
Under Tabb and Grundfest’s proposal, all banks must limit their
trading to an exchange.323 A major flaw with this proposal, however, is
that it does not take into account a bank’s credit-worthiness.324 Some
ProductSpec.shtml?specId=194 (last visited Dec. 1, 2013) (Daily U.S. Dollar future
settlements are traded based upon a volume weighted average.).
315. See id.
316. See supra notes 161–162 and accompanying text (a benchmark based upon
actual trades is conceivably more accurate).
317. See supra notes 246 –249 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 43–50 and accompanying text.
319. See supra text accompanying note 255 (according to ICAP, a larger sample of
loans creates a more accurate benchmark).
320. See supra notes 253–265, 195 and accompanying text.
321. See Tabb & Grundfest, supra note 22, at 256.
322. See id.
323. See supra notes 302–307 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 132–135 and accompanying text (the BBA held that panel
banks are the most creditworthy and thus can borrow at cheaper rates than other banks.
Tabb and Grundfest’s proposal, however, requires all banks to be treated equally
regardless of their relative creditworthiness).
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banks are more credit-worthy than others and should be able to borrow
at better rates than their peers.325 By forcing banks to lend on an
exchange with participants who have various degrees of creditworthiness, banks will be forced to lend only at the rate at which it
would lend to the least credit-worthy institution on the exchange.326 The
end result is that the exchange would have few sellers and a number of
strong banks overpaying for credit at the benefit of weaker banks.327
A solution to such a problem could be to allow banks to choose
who they are willing to lend to on the exchange.328 Similar to an open
line of credit, each bank on the exchange can create its own personal
“rating” for the other banks on the exchange.329 This rating can be
adjusted at will and is a reflection of the perceived credit risk of the
borrowing bank by the lending bank.330 The rating bank then makes an
offer where it agrees to lend funds to any bank that is above a prescribed
credit rating.331 Banks below this credit rating will not receive an
offer.332 The end result is that banks will only lend to other banks that
they trust.333
Ultimately, however, this approach may be overly burdensome on
the market.334 Currently, by allowing open lines of credit with some
banks and not others, banks are indirectly rating each other and choosing
the most credit-worthy banks.335 Similarly, by choosing to lend to only
some banks, or raising the cost of borrowing for other institutions, banks
are further, albeit indirectly, rating each other.336 However, this “rating”
is done either on a bank-by-bank basis or a loan-by-loan basis and is
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328.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See, e.g., supra note 133 and accompanying text (the BBA notes that LIBOR
quotes are generally only for banks that have an open line of credit with the lending
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335. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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market-led.337 To force banks to rate each other simply to create an
exchange may be overly burdensome on the market.338
C. HYBRID EXCHANGE
The better approach may be a modified exchange that has some of
the features of an exchange and some of the features of a
clearinghouse.339 This hybrid exchange can have bids on specific tenors
without any sellers.340 Buyers will simply state that they are looking to
borrow funds at a certain rate.341 Other banks will then have the
opportunity to lend to the buyer at the offered price.342
Market economics dictate that banks would be more willing to lend
to their most credit-worthy peers.343 The result is that less credit-worthy
banks will have to offer to pay higher costs for credit that will be
reflected in their bids.344 Because of this premium, banks will be willing
to lend to their less credit-worthy peers.345 The end result is that the
exchange will accurately depict U.S. interbank lending, and the trading
data from the exchange can be volume weighted to create an accurate
benchmark.346
Such a proposal will avoid many of the pitfalls of the previous
proposals and the Wheatley Review.347 Banks will receive a benefit in
this system over the current system. Lenders will compete with each
other to give the borrower a better price, allowing borrowers to save
money. Similarly, by having more access to potential borrowers,
lenders will also benefit from such a system. The end result is that
borrowers get better terms for their loans and lenders have more
borrowers.
337.
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341.

See id.
See supra note 334.
See supra notes 308–322 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 308–339 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 299–301 and accompanying text (explaining how an exchange
operates).
342. See id.
343. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (the BBA notes that LIBOR quotes
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344. See id.
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This proposal also avoids extensive regulation by a governing
body.348 Similar to equity and commodity exchanges, the regulatory
oversight will be limited to ensuring that the actual transactions take
place and that there is no fraud in the marketplace.349 Since there is a
counterparty to every trade, the party with the perceived advantage in
the trade will want to ensure that the trade actually takes place.350 If the
trade does not take place, the aggrieved party can report the violation to
the appropriate regulatory body.351
CONCLUSION
Banks manipulated LIBOR for many years to benefit themselves.
Despite getting creditable reports of such allegations, no comprehensive
government action was taken. In an attempt to reform LIBOR, the BBA
and the Wheatley Review did a thorough job analyzing LIBOR.
Ultimately, however, their recommendations are inadequate in the
context of the U.S. market. Although not perfect, a better LIBOR
alternative may be provided through a clearinghouse or hybrid
clearinghouse and exchange type system.

348. See supra notes 178–192 and accompanying text (under the Wheatley Review,
the new institution will be governed by independent board and a regulatory body).
349. See id.
350. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
351. See id.

